The French Revolution – from a new perspective
On the occasion of the 231st anniversary of the estimated date of the founding of the “Association of Friends of the Constitution” at the Dominican monastery on Rue Saint-Honoré in Paris (better known as the “Jacobin Club”), I would like to talk a little about a common illusion concerning the essential causes of the French Revolution.
We all remember from our school days the talk about the “dead end of the old order” – the terrible economic crisis that the French monarchy found itself in, a crisis that necessitated the convening of the Estates General, and from there began the rapid slide toward the revolution itself.
So the economic crisis did occur, but as always – the devil is in the details. It is worth understanding better what the nature of the crisis was and its details, especially in light of the fact that France, on the eve of the revolution, was not only the most cultural country of all, but also a very rich, very populous, very commercial and very industrially developed country, which on the eve of the revolution – enjoyed prolonged and stable economic growth for at least 60 years.
France – a rich country and a poor state
Its Atlantic trade was second only to that of Britain, and it encouraged innovations and rapid industrial development, especially in related industries: shipping, food, textiles, etc. The gaps between the two powers narrowed rapidly and by the mid-18th century they were destined to disappear, but then France Lost the Seven Years' War and lost most of its colonies in America, India, and Africa.
And yet – development continued, and towards French Revolution, France and England would have been on par again in key development indicators, if not for the revolution. During this period, the prohibition on the active participation of the nobility in commercial life had largely disappeared and it did play an important role in the economy – more than half of the country's metallurgical plants belonged to it and there, as in other branches of industry, a rapid integration of advanced steam technology took place.
Arguably, the most important segment of the market in agrarian society belonged to agricultural produce, and agriculture was almost the last to join modernity. However, in the 18th century, modernization processes also gained momentum there, especially in the large farms owned by the nobility and wealthier farmers.
The state did its part by paving roads, building bridges, and digging canals, and regional specialization in the various branches of agriculture contributed to serious growth even in this conservative industry – from 1709 to 1780 it grew by 40%.
All of this was, of course, reflected in unprecedented and unrivaled demographic growth – France, with its 30 million inhabitants, became the most populous country in all of Europe, except for Russia. It was not for nothing that it managed to recruit cycle after cycle of fighters during nearly 25 consecutive years of stubborn fighting.
In short, France before the Revolution was a rich country; what was poor was the French state, which was forced to finance increasing expenses for modernization from an ancient, essentially medieval, taxation system.
Privileges are destroying the French economy
Beyond the needs of peace, one of the greatest expenses was the maintenance of a modern army, which required new and terribly expensive management, recruitment, training, and equipment processes. France was not alone in having to deal with this paradox – all the absolute monarchies in Europe were in the same boat and tried to find their own original solutions.
The name of the central problem of taxation in the old order is “privilege.” Most of them, although certainly not all, were granted to the two upper classes of the state – the clergy and the nobility. This is not to say that the clergy and the nobility did not pay taxes – they did, and how.
The nobility, like the third estate, paid poll tax and indirect taxes, and the clergy gave an annual financial offering to the monarchy – a fairly large sum. What the two upper estates did not pay was the main tax – the tax on the lands they owned, and as the progressive nobility gradually acquired more and more agricultural lands from the poor peasants, this main tax base was constantly shrinking, while the tax became increasingly burdensome for those who were still required to pay it.
The additional privileged problem was that the kings of France used to grant collective chumps to loyal communities in the form of temporary or eternal exemption from various taxes - especially during the religious civil wars of the previous century - there were entire cities, or smaller settlements, that were forever exempted from paying land taxes, for example, which obviously weighed more heavily on the pockets and minds of active taxpayers.
As mentioned, the problem was not unique to France; all European monarchies dealt with it, each in its own way. Thus, Maria Theresa of Austria took advantage of the crushing defeat at the hands of Prussia to mobilize all classes for the national mission of reclaiming Silesia. Patriotic spirits were aroused, and the monarchy significantly curtailed class privileges in taxation.
The attempt to abolish privileges led to the outbreak of the French Revolution.
And this is essentially the story of the financial cause of the revolution – the monarchy and its ministers trying to find a way to abolish class privileges and collect taxes equitably. The first important attempt in this direction was made by Louis XV's Comptroller of the Treasury (the most important minister in the French government), Jean-Baptiste de Machaut d'Arneuville, in 15:
On the one hand, he abolished the temporary and heavy tax imposed on all classes during the War of the Austrian Succession (“the tithe”) and on the other hand, he introduced a 5% tax that applied to all classes, all property, and all income except that from hired labor. Naturally, the main losers were people with a lot of property and high incomes, and they went out to fight against the decree.
At the forefront of the aristocratic opposition stood the senior jurists and the institutions that formed the basis of their power: the 13 parliaments (remember – in France these are not legislatures, but courts), 4 “supreme courts”, 15 tax audit chambers and 10 customs chambers.
The positions in these institutions were purchased with money and passed down by inheritance, and the official could only be removed from office if the price of the position was paid back. The royal treasury did not have the money for this (each institution contained hundreds of such prestigious positions) and with some exaggeration it can be argued that this robed nobility did not see the monarchy from the ground up.
In any case, conflicts between them and the king's ministers were a completely routine matter, and these conflicts sometimes escalated into a real civil war, as during the joyous days of the Fronde in the mid-17th century.
Particularly powerful were the parliaments, which, in practice, controlled the ratification of royal laws in the provinces under their control – if the members of the local parliament believed that the new law violated the ancient, traditional and generally unwritten laws (thanks to the objective humanist values of their modern successors), they were entitled to return the law back with an official written protest, and then the law was required to undergo changes and potentially – this procedure made it possible to block any legislation by the government.
The king had a doomsday weapon in store – he could come personally to the Paris parliament (and his official representatives in the provinces – to the provincial parliaments) and then the law would be approved automatically, without discussion or protest. But even then, the jurists had enough tools (amendments to the law itself, updated regulations detailing its use, etc.) to empty it of all content. So much for the “absolute monarchy” in France.
Then the nobility of the cloak, with the active assistance of the “nobility of the sword” and especially of the church – turned to put a damper on de Machaut’s reform. At first (after three years of delays and exhausting negotiations) the government yielded to ecclesiastical pressure, and the new tax passed over the first estate, and in 1754, the king yielded to opposition pressure and dismissed de Machaut, allowing the jurists to trample on his legislation and dismantle it with a flood of regulations regarding the “special exceptions”, which emptied the general and fair tax of all meaning.